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Article 4

Wildlife Emotions: Animal Rights
as Examined Through A
Cognitivist Lens
By K. L. Schultz
Abstract: The aim of this article is to revisit and redefine the scope of a Kantian rights-based
theory to include non-human animals. Generally, rights-based theories are predicated on
a Kantian deontology that excludes all but rational subjects from possessing of basic
rights. Historically, non-human animals—once thought to act on impulse and desire
alone—have been excluded from rights-based considerations. However, more recent
literature from emotions theorist Martha Nussbaum suggests an alternative picture for
non-human animals. Cognitivist theories like Nussbaum’s, alongside intensive scientific
research, support the notion that non-human animals show signs of intentionality and
possess the capacity to emote. If Nussbaum’s theory is correct that emotions are indeed
intelligent, potentially rational, evaluative judgments, then non-human animals are in fact
rational agents. Therefore, non-human animals should be granted limited protections
under a deontological moral framework. Ultimately, I shall detail what these limited
protections might look like.

I. The Inner Lives of Non-Human Animals
Historically, there has been much debate over the cognitive capacities of
non-human animals. Such inquiry often surrounds the following question: do
non-human animals, as they experience the world around them, experience an
inner life much like that of humans? Today, many researchers have found that
non-human animals possess the capacity for innovation. For example, multiple
studies suggest the guppy fish is an innovative forager. Furthermore, there seems
to be a direct correlation between innovation and continued motivation. It was
concluded that guppies that had shown innovative tendencies once were more
1
likely to be innovative again, therefore suggesting a personality trait.
Interestingly, female guppies and guppies of smaller sizes tended to be more
innovative, as perhaps both groups of guppies had more motivation to do so. For
the smaller guppies, competition for the food source might have been a
motivating factor, and for female guppies, a larger quantity of foraged food leads
to successful reproduction.
The guppy fish is not the only non-human animal to show signs of
innovation. Chimpanzees have been known to make their own tools using grass,
2
twigs, and stones. Dolphins, who are also known for being extremely intelligent ,
3
have been known to create and use tools as well. The bottlenose dolphin not only
recognizes their own reflection in a mirror but, with training, they can also
comprehend language and respond to vocal commands. Perhaps the most notable
expression of bottlenose dolphins’ creativity and intelligence is their innovative
tool making. Bottlenose dolphins have been known to tear off sponges to use
them as protection for their long snouts—or rostrums—when foraging for food.
Despite the evidence, however, there are those who still question whether
these kinds of examples actually reveal that non-human animals have cognitive
capacities like us. Followers of Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant, and B.F. Skinner
have held opposing views while nevertheless advancing theories that focus on the
notion that non-human animals are not exactly rationally autonomous creatures ,
and that their behavior has been merely conditioned through prolonged exposure,
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leading them to respond to select stimuli. These theories paint a picture of the
inner-lives of non-human animals as largely un-rational automatons, acting on
instinct and conditioning alone. Still, even if non-human animals are for the most
part acting on some combination of instinct and behavioral conditioning, what
about emotions?
Charles Darwin was the first scientist to systematically study non-human
animal emotions. Hr suggested that non-human animals do, in fact, share similar
emotional experiences to humans and that there is perhaps a continuation between
human and non-human animal emotions, one that is similar in kind, though
5
different in degree. Darwin’s pioneering work in The Expression of the Emotions
in Man and Animals was a formal catalyst for rekindling the conversation on the
6
age-old inquiry of the emotional lives of non-human animals.
In more recent years, advancements in neuroimaging technology have
made non-invasive research of non-human animals more accessible, and scientists
have been able to gain a better understanding of what the inner-lives of
non-human animals look like from a strictly objective and scientific standpoint.
Field research has also played a huge part in collecting scientific data on
non-human animal emotions in the wild. Wildlife biologists have observed not
only what they take to be fear, anger, and joy in non-human animals, but also
more emotionally complex expressions like empathy. Non-human animals have
been found to empathize with members of their own species as well as with those
belonging to a different species altogether. In one case, a lost woman, who
suffered from poor vision, was rescued and protected by a herd of elephants. She
was found with the elephants guarding her as “they had encased her in a sort of
7
cage of branches to protect her from hyenas.” Humpback whales have also been
known to express cross-species empathy. In one documented case, a humpback
whale swept a seal out of the water and onto its back to save it from being hunted
by killer whales. Expressions of empathy suggest a strong disposition for
emotionality in non-human animals, as empathy is seemingly more complex than
the basic emotions such as fear, anger, and joy.
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This article attempts to establish an argument for non-human animal rights
on a Kantian basis, despite the traditional rejection of such rights. In §II, I will
paint a much more colorful picture of the inner-lives of non-human animals. I will
point to how the empirical evidence for non-human animal emotions, when
applied to Martha Nussbaum's cognitivist theory of emotions, logically entails
that non-human animals are rationally autonomous, as they engage in cognitively
evaluative judgments to which they act accordingly. In §III, I will provide a
defense of cognitivism in light of some challenging objections to the theory. In
§IV, I will examine a Kantian rights-based theory, ultimately suggesting that
emotional cognitivism supplies the premises needed for a limited extension of
basic rights to non-human animals. Lastly, in §V, I will discuss what this would
mean for our ethical obligations to select members of the wildlife community, and
consider what protections non-human animals should be entitled to.
II. Martha Nussbaum’s Cognitivist Account of Emotion
If the empirical evidence explored above does show us that non-human
animals emote, what else might this imply? In other words, what does it mean to
say that an animal is emoting? Emotions theorist Martha Nussbaum’s cognitivist
revision of the Ancient Greek Stoic view offers a metaphysical account of
emotions. On this account, Nussbaum argues that emotions are cognitively
evaluative judgments that include, but do not necessarily require, an affective
8
state in the agent who emotes. According to Nussbaum, when one is emoting,
they are judging the evaluative quality of some object, and what ultimately gives
rise to a particular emotional state is not the identity of the object we evaluate ,
9
but the way in which we evaluate it . Lastly, being eudaimonistic in nature,
Nussbaum argues that emotions are in direct correspondence with the agent’s
10
flourishing. In Upheavals of Thought, she expands her cognitivist theory to
include non-human animals, stating: “experimentalists give us reason to conclude
that animals are emotional, and that their emotions, like ours, are appraisals of the
11
world, as it relates to their well-being.”
Nussbaum points to a few non-human animal case studies to strengthen
her inclusion of non-human animal emotionality. One such reference points to the
Martha Nussbaum, “Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance,” in Thinking about
Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions, ed. Robert C. Solomon (Oxford University
Press, 2004), 273.
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philosopher George Pitcher, who has cultivated a large body of work in regard to
the intentionality of human emotions. In The Dogs Who Came To Stay, Pitcher
examines the colorful lives of his own dogs, Lupa and Remus, and argues that
their actions and behavior seem to possess a similar intentionality. Nussbaum
notes that the biography “pursues no theoretical agenda, although it displays the
same observation capacities that are used to good theoretical ends in the
12
philosophical work.” In his findings, Pitcher suggests that dogs are indeed
capable of a type of “unguarded and unqualified” love that even humans often
don’t possess, as the conditionality of love is perhaps unique to the human
13
experience. In his work, Pitcher is able to successfully make the distinction of
how the bond with Lupa and Remus looks much different than an attachment that
is purely instrumental as a means of survival.
Upon returning home, Pitcher is greeted with warm affection, and, when
there is physical distance between himself and his canine companions, Lupa and
Remus explicitly show signs of psychological distress. Beyond an outward
expression of their own interests, they remarkably seem to have an investment in
Pitcher’s wellbeing, as they actively try to comfort him when he is feeling low.
This extension of compassion seems to exhibit intentionality and demands us to
recognize their pursuits and evaluative judgments as intelligent and indeed
other-regarding. The psychological work of other-regarding expresses intelligent
intentionality, thought, deliberation, and care for another’s well-being, and stands
on its own without room for human projection. If certain non-human animals have
the mental capacity to extend beyond their own experience and possess the ability
to make intelligent, evaluative judgments in terms of the well-being of others,
then it is reasonable to assume that they have the capacity to make evaluative
judgments regarding themselves. If Nussbaum’s cognitivist theory of emotion is
correct, we must acknowledge that since members of the wildlife community have
the capacity to actively make intelligent evaluative judgments towards both
themselves and others, then they are capable of emoting in these ways.
III. Defending the Cognitivist View
The general public’s take on emotional experiences is typically intuitive in
nature and looks very different than Nussbaum’s cognitivist theory. When people
are asked to describe what an emotion is, their responses typically follow suit with
the popular belief that emotions manifest themselves as feelings. It is also
commonly entertained that emotions are whimsical in nature, even unpredictable
12
13
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at times, as they seem to arrive out of thin air, appearing and disappearing
effortlessly. Essentially, it is widely accepted that emotions, perhaps, are
something we have little control over, expressing themselves through bodily
sensations. Given the large body of diverse theories and the philosophical
literature regarding emotions, it would be unrealistic to address them all.
Nevertheless, in defense of the cognitivist theory, I will address some popular
criticisms.
In the case of Lupa and Remus, one might raise the concern that perhaps
Pitcher is anthropomorphizing the experience of his beloved dogs. In fact,
Nussbaum herself cautions that we must refer to detailed histories of interaction
and observation of the animal under study to ensure that our conclusions don’t fall
14
victim to the “twin pitfalls of reductionism and anthropocentrism.” The absence
of any self-reporting evidence with regards to non-human animal emotions does
15
present a significant limitation and challenge. Nevertheless, as Nussbaum
herself retorts, “there’s always room for skepticism about these attributions of
intelligence and emotion to animals. But at this point, it is useful to remind
ourselves that our attribution of emotion to other human beings itself involves
16
projection that goes beyond the evidence.” Nussbaum seems to concede that the
intuitive charge of anthropomorphism may be one that cannot be satisfactorily
overcome at this time but we must also recognize that the very idea behind this
objection applies to interpersonal claims of emotionality as well. Therefore, one
cannot reject emotional cognitivism as mere projection without saying the same
of interpersonal attributions of emotionality in humans. If we can take it for
granted that other people really have emotional experiences, then the objection
loses its force.
One might also object that a non-human animal, such as a dog, cannot be
engaging in evaluative judgments, such as “fear,” or what might be linguistically
conveyed as the evaluative judgment, “I am in danger.” This is because so many
dogs exhibit what looks like fearful behavior in circumstances where they are
clearly not in any actual danger. Imagine a dog that continues to bark with “fear”
long after a stranger has innocuously walked across their yard. The dog begins
frantically running around the house, searching every room and looking out every
Ibid., 120. The potential oversimplification in non-human animal research, studying specific
parts to create a larger narrative as well as human tendency to project our own values and
emotions onto the experience of non-human animals, are two common challenges that scientists
have to take into consideration when performing field studies.
15
Acknowledging the communication barriers between non-human animals and humans that exist,
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the emotional life of non-human animals to supplement the absence of testimony.
16
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window. Given the absence of any real threat, are we not just projecting our own
evaluative judgments concerning danger onto a dog whose behavior looks similar
to our own fearful behavior? If so, then what’s really happening is nothing more
than a prolonged affective state that is either instinctual or conditioned.
Nevertheless, this objection does not sufficiently preclude the possibility
that the dog is, in fact, making such a cognitively evaluative judgment, albeit in
its own comparatively ignorant way. We might consider how the dog keeps
checking every room while tracing the perimeter of the house so as to convince
itself that there really is no threat still looming in the area. Perhaps it just takes the
dog longer to reach the evaluative conclusion that their territory is safe, ultimately
allaying its fear. Thus, the objection is a non-starter. In fact, it bears its own
anthropomorphic tendencies by projecting onto the dog an undue level of
competence that should not be expected of them simply because we would expect
it of ourselves.
Another significant challenge for the cognitivist account is the idea of
recalcitrant emotions. Philosophers Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson state that
an emotion is recalcitrant when it “exists despite the agent’s making a judgment
17
that is in tension with it.” In cases of recalcitrance, the individual emoting
continues to do so despite an expressed belief to the contrary. A commonly cited
example concerns cases where individuals show a recalcitrant fear of flying while
being able to express the belief that flying is not, in fact, dangerous. So how could
they logically be holding an evaluative belief that flying is dangerous and yet not
dangerous at the same time? It must be that fear is not actually a cognitively
evaluative judgment but some other tendency altogether.
Nevertheless, we can make sense of recalcitrant emotions on a cognitivist
account. Recalcitrant emotion objections like this happen to consider
circumstances that take into account statistical averages. However, the recalcitrant
objection fails to acknowledge the distinction between the statistically normative
assessments of danger and agent-relative assessments of dangers, which include a
separate variety of factors in its overall assessment. So, for example, the prospect
of dying in a car crash while commuting to work in Nevada might have a
statistical average of about 1/10,000, which, barring all other considerations,
seems extremely low to moderately low in terms of statistically normative
assessments of danger. Nevertheless, take a situation where the statistical average
is the same—say a 10,000-piece box of candies where you happen to know that
one of the pieces of candies contains a lethal dose of cyanide. The prospect of just
trying a piece of candy might suddenly induce the evaluative judgments of fear, in
Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion,” Real Institute
of Philosophy Supplement, 52 (2003): 124.
17
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the agent-relative sense of the term, given one’s own psychological profile,
personal experiences, skills, prospects, and alternative interests that might factor
into the equation. These factors can also explain why the opposite can hold in
cases where the statistically normative assessments report that a certain activity is
highly dangerous (e.g., high rise tight-rope walking over a certain distance), and
yet, for some individuals with certain psychological profiles, personal
experiences, skills, prospects, and alternative interests, the agent-relative
evaluative judgment ultimately expresses itself with equanimity.
D’Arms and Jacobson present a case where an individual is afraid to fly
despite being aware of the statistical data that flying is safer than traveling by
automobile. Nevertheless, this recalcitrant fear of flying might be stemming from
an agent-relative sense of the term that factors the agent’s own psychological
profile (perhaps a history of low self-confidence), personal experiences (perhaps
they have a history of watching hours of terrifying plane crash footage), prospects
(perhaps they lust for their own life more than the average person), and alternative
interests (they enjoy driving). Therefore, an individual who knows what the
statistics say about the dangers of flying might agree that flying is not dangerous
in the statistically normative sense of the term, and yet still evaluate the prospect
of flying as too dangerous for them in the agent-relative sense of the term.
Granted, the judgment may seem odd, but it can’t be considered the same as a
simultaneous belief in p and not-p.
At the very least, this distinction requires more to be said of the agent’s
own thinking and personal experiences in order to explain their own
agent-relative assessments in contrast to the statistically normative assessments.
Lastly, these agent-relative conditions might also account for the effectiveness of
exposure therapy, as the agent is able to temper their fear with more positive
evaluative judgments that come along with enhancing their own sense of personal
experience and self-confidence regarding the object in question, giving the
individual a greater sense of control over the situation. Practicing tight-rope
walking for years is, in one sense, a form of exposure therapy that can allow a
person to make the kinds of agent-relative evaluative judgments that go beyond
what they know is rationally considered to be safe in the statistically normative
sense.
One might object to this response by considering an alternative case where
the emotion of pride is expressed and where the agent has no good reason to
believe that they have done anything worthy of merit. But in the face of judgment,
people do not always give an honest self-report. Therefore, in cases of “pride,” it
is important to distinguish whether the expression is being deceptively performed
or if it is, in fact, a genuine emotion, i.e., a cognitively evaluative judgment of
one’s personal achievements. Consider cases of success regarding individuals

7

who were born into “old money.” Are these individuals feeling prideful for their
entrepreneurial accomplishments even though they seem fully competent enough
to recognize that the stage had already been set for them at birth? It seems far
more likely in this scenario that they are feigning pride to signal to others that
they are socially deserving of their wealth. Furthermore, even in cases where the
pride is sincere, it is not unlikely that someone who spends enough time telling
themselves that their success has been self-made might come to suppress any fact
to the contrary, thus leading to actual pride over time through temporally induced
self-deception.
IV. Animal Rights on A Kantian Account
As an advocate of duty-based, or deontological, ethics, Immanuel Kant’s
moral philosophy was concerned with the moral status of actions
in-and-of-themselves, rather than their outcomes or consequences. Kant believed
that morally right actions were to be distinguished from preferred actions and,
therefore, the theory is attractive in the sense that it does not fall victim to
arbitrary subjectivity. For Kant, morality is derived from what he took to be the
uniquely human capacity for both autonomy and reason. From this, Kant
concluded that moral principles of action are those that can be universalized
without incurring a practical contradiction concerning rationally autonomous
agents. In Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant presents the categorical
imperative. There are three distinct formulations of this supreme principle that
Kant offers, all of which he claims are logically the same. The principle worth
noting for the purposes of this argument is Kant’s Formula of Humanity, which is
his second formulation. This principle commands us to treat all rationally
18
autonomous agents as an end-in-itself and never as a mere means.
Kant’s moral philosophy has been foundational for grounding some
theories of basic human rights. This is because Kant’s Formula of Humanity
provides an understanding of the moral right by which basic human rights—such
as the right to life—can be grounded. However, given that Kant’s theory begins
from first principles concerning autonomy and reason, it has often been assumed
that non-human animals are not to be protected by right, as their instinctual and
conditioned existence lacks the necessary rational autonomy to include them in
the moral community. Kant himself once stated the following:

Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Lara Denis, trans. Mary Gregor
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
18
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The fact that the human being can have the representation “I”
raises him infinitely above all the other beings on earth. By this he
is a person…that is, a being altogether different in rank and dignity
from things, such as irrational animals, with which one may deal
19
and dispose at one’s discretion.
Presently, our duties with regards to non-human animals reflect this
traditional line of thinking, as any protections granted to non-human animals are
indirect in nature. Non-human animals are still considered human property. For
example, if someone poisoned another’s outdoor cat, it would be a violation of the
owner’s property rights, not a violation of the cat’s rights. These same notions of
property can be problematic in regard to non-domesticated animals as well.
Wildlife living within the bounds of certain geographical coordinates are viewed
as the “property” of a wildlife preserve, national park, or at times, even property
of the state itself.
Nevertheless, as previously shown, there is empirical evidence that
non-human animals emote. If this is so, and we apply this to Nussbaum’s
cognitivist theory of emotions, then we can grant that non-human animals engage
in cognitively evaluative judgments, which means that they have the capacity for
20
autonomous reason. For example, if an animal held against its will began to
express fear, as well as the relevant corresponding behavior, then it cognitively
possesses a judgment that might be linguistically interpreted as “my life is in
danger” (i.e., fear), as well as the corresponding will to act accordingly. In other
words, it is engaging with autonomous reason. Therefore, the rational nature of
fear suggests that non-human animals hold a rationally vested interest in their
safety, and thus imposing on this would violate the principle of treating such
agents always as an end-in-themselves and never as a mere means.
Nussbaum’s defense of a non-human animal’s ability to emote suggests
that non-human animals can make evaluative judgments as rational agents,
allowing us to view cases of non-human animal fear for what it is: a cognitively
evaluative judgment concerning some imposing threat, which can include, but is
not limited to, the integrity of one’s own bodily autonomy. Therefore, given that
non-human animals have rationally vested interests, as expressed in certain cases
of fear on the cognitivist account, we can conclude on a deontological framework
that non-human animals require limited-protections in the form of rights, as
non-human animals possess all the qualifications necessary for consideration.
See Kant, Lectures on Anthropology, 7, 127.
It’s worth noting here that unlike Tom Regan, whose deontological approach dispenses with the
criterion of rationality, this argument aims to preserve this criterion. For more on Regan’s
approach, see, Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (University of California Press, 2004).
19
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V. Moving Forward: What Does This Rights-based Inclusion Mean for Both
Non-Human And Human Animals?
Inspired by a cognitivist account of emotion, it is not just human life, but
emotionally cognitive life that entails the capacity for reason. This is because
some non-human animals have the capacity for emotional behavior, leading to the
rational effectuation of their will in accordance with evaluative judgments. Upon
this recognition, we ought to change the way we currently view some non-human
animals by acknowledging and respecting their moral agency as rationally
self-determined ends-in-themselves. This will mean granting them the same moral
grounds necessary for a limited scope of basic rights.
As rational agents that hold interests in their own bodily autonomy, it is
only logically necessary that we extend the same moral basis for human rights in
this regard to the arbitrary use and/or disposal of non-human persons. This
revision of the moral status of non-human animals might suggest a legal
abolishment of the use of animals for agricultural pursuits, ultimately making the
institution of factory farming obsolete. Similarly, laboratory testing on
non-human animals might also be banned, as using non-human animals as
research subjects against their own will violates their rational autonomy. Lastly,
trophy hunting would likely be prohibited as well, along with any hunting for
purposes other than one’s own impending survival.
These legal provisions would require a significant reconfiguration of our
current agricultural, research, and recreational practices. Such changes would
require immense federal effort as well as support in the public sphere both
legislatively and monetarily to get things off the ground; this challenging reality
does not go unnoticed. Nevertheless, a shift in our perspective towards viewing all
emotionality as rational may provide us with the motivation to respect the dignity
of non-human animal life.
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